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In theory and on the basis of current specific legislation there are two main 
statutes which may, and have actually infringed upon the right to protection 
from deprivation of property without compensation (Article 37 of the 
Constitution) and to protection from privacy of home and other property (Article 
38 of the Constitution). These are the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) 
Ordinance and the Housing Act (Chapters 88 and 125 respectiveiy of the Laws 
of Malta), the latter as amended by Act XXXVII of 1989. 
The limitations to the above-mentioned rights are specifically established 
by the relative provisos contained in the respective Articles of the Constitution. 
This does not create any particular difficulty as it is based on the generally 
accepted principle enunciated by John Stuart Mill: the liberty of the individual 
must be thus limited: he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. 
Section 47(9) of the Constitution 
However, section 47(9) of the Constitution gives rise to a number of 
problems in its interpretation and application in so far as it directs that the 
fundamental right to protection from deprivation of property without 
compensation may be legally infringed upon with the operation of any law in 
force immediately before 3rd March 1962, or any law made on or after that 
date that amends or replaces any law in force immediately before that date 
( or such a law as from time to time amended or replaced in the manner described 
in that sub-section), provided that such amendment or substitution does not 
incur any of the prohibitions expressly laid down by paragraphs (a) (b) (c) and 
(d) of section 47(9).
On a cursory look at the said section 47(9) one would be correctly tempted
to conclude that both the Land Acquisition Ordinance, being and enactment 
of 1935, and the Housing Act, being enacted in 1949, are safeguarded from 
any allegation of a violation of section 3 7 in terms of section 4 7(9) itself. Even 
the above-mentioned 1989 substantial amendments to the Housing Act are 
safeguarged from any possible violation of section 37 as these, rather than adding 
to the kinds of property that may be taken possession of or the rights over and 
interests in property that may be acquired, have limited the kinds of property 
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subject to such possession or acquisition, have not made the conditions 
governing entitlement to compensation or the amount thereof less favourable 
to any person owing or interested in the property, and have not deprived any 
person claiming such compensation a right of access to an indpendent and 
impartial court or tribunal established by law for the purpose of determining 
his interest in or right over the property and the amount of any compensation 
to which he may be entitled, and for the purpose of obtaining payment of that 
compensation, and securing to any party to proceedings in that court or tribunal 
relating to such a claim a right of appeal from its determination to the Court 
of Appeal in Malta. 
Yet, in reality, what particular legislation, if at all, did the legislator had 
in mind when drafting the limitation referred to in section 47(9)? Or was it 
meant to be a simple general blanket p_rovision? This point, perhaps, may today 
be more of an acdemical than of a practical value in view of the current 
amendment being debated in Parliament aiming to make all legislation subject 
to chapter IV of the Constitution, and in view of Act XIV of 1987 which again 
renders all Maltese legislation subject to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Be that as it may, the point was taken to Court in a case recently decided 
by the First Hall of the Civil Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction. (Architect 
Edwin Delia et vs Housing Secretary, 14 / 6 / 1991, as per Mr Justice Caruana 
Colombo, now pending in the Constitutional Court). Mr Delia alleged that 
the limitation laid down by section 47(9) applied only with reference to the 
Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance, and that the Housing Act did 
not come within the scope thereof. He contended that even the legislative text 
was indicative of his allegation. Although the Court did not directly dispose 
of the issue raised as it found that it need not enquire whether respondent's 
demand to applicant to afford recognition to the tenant allocated subject 
premises pursuant to the relative Requisition Order in terms of section 8 of 
the Housing Act violated section 37 of the Constitution, once the requisites 
of the latter section were not satisfied in fact, it nevertheless seemed inclined 
to accept respondent's argument that had the legislator wanted to limit the 
scope of section 47(9) only to the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance 
he would have expressly stated so. ubi lex voluit dixit. Perhaps the issue might 
crop up again for deliberation in the Constitutional Court! 
The Eµropean Convention 
As has already been said, Act XIV of 1987 has rendered all Maltese 
legislation subject to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Thus, to a limited extent, the right to 
protection from privacy of home, enshrined by section 38 of the Constitution, 
is once more found in Article 8 of the European Convention, wliich lays down 
one's right to one's private and family life, home and correspondence, whereas 
the right to the protection from deprivation of property without compensation 
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is broadly found in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention, which 
ensures that every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions. Some worthwhile considerations are called for in this regard. 
Section 38 of the Constitution affords protection to a right partaking of 
both of a personal (i.e. privacy of home) as well as of a real (i.e. property) 
nature. The right protected by Article 8 of the Convention definitely partakes 
of an exclusively personal nature, as one's private and family life, home and 
correspondence cannot but be classified as thus. Undoubtedly, there is a 
discernible overlapping between the concept of property as found in sections 
37 and 38 of the Constitution. What is the difference between the two and how 
are the terms '' No person shall be subjected to the search ..... of his property 
or the entry by others on his premises" to be properly construed? What is the 
difference between 'property' and 'premises' � found in section 38? Is the 
definition of 'premises' to be limited only to residential premises, or must one 
rely on the general and unlimited definition as used in popular English language 
such that any house or land is covered? 
That issue had also been raised in the case Architect Delia vs Housing 
Secretary, referred to earlier on. The Court was left in no doubt that, within 
the purview of section 38 taken as a whole, and which affords greater protection 
to the personal rather than the real aspect of the right in question, 'premises 
could only be taken to mean residential premises, i.e. it is a pre-requisite for 
the purposes of that section that one must be in immediate and physical 
possession of one's property and premises. Again, this deliberation is pending 
on appeal in the Constitutional Court. 
Basing oneself on this position so far enunciated by the Maltese Court 
with regard thereto, the issue might become problematic and further 
complicated in the context of the European Convention. At a first glance, it 
would seem that the equivalent of the local protection to one's right not to be 
subjected to the search of his property or the entry by others on his premises 
(as interpreted by the Maltese Court referred to above) lies in Article 8 of the 
Convention in so far as the right to one's home would also require the immediate 
and physical possession of 'premises'. Yet there is more to it than meets the eye. 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention is so worded that it would 
appear to incorporate more than just the counter-part to the local right to the 
protection from deprivation of property without compensation. Indeed, it does 
not directly mention the right to compensation as I shall presently outline. Nor, 
for that matter, does it adopt the word 'property'. 
The said Article 1 starts off by establishing the right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of one's possessions. This might easily entail that no person may 
be subjected to the search of his property or the entry by others on his premises. 
It also appears to entail that no property of any description may be compulsorily 
taken possession of. What is one to understand by "possessions"? 
46 ID-DRITT Law Journal Vol. XVI 
Interpretation of ''possessions'' 
Movables and immovables as well as corporeal and in-corporeal possessions 
definitely fall within this right and are afforded protection. Obviously, possession 
has to be legitimate as otherwise no such protection may be invoked. Yet can 
there be one kind of possession, which, though legitimate for all intents and 
purposes of ordinary law, may not necessarily have the above-mentioned 
protection extended thereto? Does the European Convention afford protection 
to the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions held by a real title as 
opposed to possession held only by a personal title, or both? What if, for 
example, one temporarily possesses property by title of lease (being a personal 
right) and is prevented from ejoying the peaceful possession thereof? Indeed, 
according to section 8(2) of the Housing Act the Director of Social Housing 
may requisition a dewelling house from a .tenant in possession thereof. And 
for the purposes of the said Act, "requisition" means taking possession of a 
building or requiring the building to be placed at the disposal of the 
requisitioning authority, and ''requisitionee'' means the person or persons from 
whose possession (without any qualification) a building has been requisitioned 
by the requisitioning authority. 
· The definition of possession at Maltese ordinary law is so worded that
it impinges on this problem of interpretation and application in such a manner 
that possession held by personal title is left in a most uncertain position. Section 
524 of the Civil Code lays down that: 
"(1) Possession is the detention of a corporeal thing or the enjoyment of a 
right, the ownership of which may be acuqired and which a person holds or 
exercises as his own. 
(2) A person may possess by means of another who holds the.thing or exercises
the right in the name of such person.
(3) A person who has the detention or custody of a thing but in the name
of another person, is called a holder''.
The nature of possession as outlined above affords certain ordinary rights 
to the possessor in case of molestation or in case of spoliation, but not always 
such fundamental rights to property and possession as enshrined in the 
Constitution and the European Convention. 
But, then, what is one to make out of section 37 of the Constitution when 
it prohibits the compulsory acquisition of an interest in or right over property 
of any description? While, on the one hand, there should be no doubt that 
the interest which a prospective buyer of land might have on a promise of sale 
absolutely does not come within the parameters of section 37 (Alfred Balzan 
vs Prime Minister et, Constitutional Court, 15th January, 1991), though it 
might be of importance for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Ordinance 
where 'owner' is defined to include a person hav1.ng an interest in the land 
( qualified as 'legal interest' in section 9(2) thereof), on the other hand, it does 
not result that the Maltese Courts ( or the European Court' for that matter) 
have ever directly dealt with the issue here raised, and it remains to be seen 
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whether the concept of possession and related interests will undergo further 
evolution. 
It has already been noted that to a very large extent the Constitution 
protects both the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance and the 
Housing Act from any allegation that they violate section 37 of the Constitution, 
but that they receive no similar protection with regard to the provisions of the 
European Convention. Or do they in some manner or other? 
Limitations Under The European Convention 
An interesting limitation to the right set forth in Article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the Convention lays out that no one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law. Moreover, a state 
is in no way impaired the right to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure 
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
Thus, it would appear that if there is a deprivation of possession as 
authorised by national law and in the public interest, the exception contemplated 
by the Convention will become the rule and the relative fundamental right is 
left in abeyance. 
Although there are marked differences in substance and in the procedure 
meant to achieve their scope and purposes, it cannot be denied that both the 
Land Acquisition Ordinance and the Housing Act have, by law, the conditions 
provided in the achievement of their respective purposes, and both aim for 
such purposes in the public interest. Indeed, the Land Acquisition Ordinance 
itself limits the said acquisition only to public purposes. But is a public purpose 
one and the same thing as the public interest? No such problem of interpretation 
arises in connection with the Housing Act as it only mentions the public interest 
which, on its part, is defined to mean making provisions for securing living 
accommodation to the homeless and for ensuring a fair distribution of living 
accommodation. 
Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Ordinance provides that the President 
of Malta may by declaration signed by him declare any land to be required 
for a public purpose. Section 6 of the same Ordinance then lays down that 
no person shall require any proof of the said public purpose other than the 
declaration of the President of Malta. 
Public Interest 
In spite of that, one would be justified to query whether any such 
declaration that land is required for a public purpose can be challenged in the 
local courts in the light of the relative provision of the European Convention, 
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made locally enforceable by Act XIV of 1987, which allows a signatory state 
a measure of appreciation in what may be deemed necessary to control the 
use of property in accordance with the general interest. 
So far we have nothing much to go by except a partial judgement on this 
point by the First Hall of the Civil Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction in 
the case Tracisio Borg et vs Commissioner of Land (3rd May, 1991 as per 
Mr Justice Anton Depasquale) to the effect that, in spite of what section 6 of 
the Land Acquisition Ordinance and the proviso of Article 1 of the First Protocol 
to the European Convention actually entail, a declaration that land is required 
for a public purpose may be challenged on the basis of an allegation thadand 
is not really required for a public purpose. 
Seen in what should be its proper perspective, I feel that a declaration 
that land is required for a public. purpose is simply a manifestation of 
Government intention with regard to that land, which should not be subject 
to judicial review by any court, but which should fail exclusively within the 
administrative and political domain of Government. This is what the margin 
of appreciation left to each signatory State should implicate. How the intention 
so manifested is realised in actual fact is a different matter and procedure should 
be completely subject to judicial review by the court in allowing an allegation 
that the use of the expropriated land did not justify the means adopted by 
Government in declaring that land to be required for a public purpose. Of 
course, there is no uniformity of thought and practice in determining what 
constitutes a public purpose. 
Compensation 
In the Constitution it is an established precept inherent to the right to 
protection from deprivation of property that when such deprivation satisfies 
the legal requisites of section 37 that deprivation is subject to full and adequate 
payment of compensation representing the real value of the property 
expropriated according to the criteria laid down by the Land Acquisition 
Ordinance. Such precept is only indirectly referred to in the relative provision 
of the European Convention which relies on the general principles of 
international law. These principles, undoubtedly, entertain claims for 
compensation in much the same way as a similar claim would be entertained 
by the Maltese court. 
The point to be queried, however, is whether the law requires that first 
compensation must be paid in order that the expropriating authority can 
consider itself to have legally taken possession of the expropriate land. 
This was the argument put forward by applicants in the case Anton Attard 
et vs Minister of Social Policy et decided by the First Hall of the Civil Court 
(as per Mr Justice Franco Depasquale, 9th May, 1990), still pending on appeal 
to the Constitutional Court. The Court there dismissed the argument as 
unfounded at law for a number of reasons. No direct or indirect inference could 
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be made that either the Land Acquisition Ordinance itself or section 3 7 of the 
Constitution direct that compensation must first be paid for the expropriation 
to be valid at law. Furthermore, the ration legis of both laws cannot but lead 
to the same conclusion. If this were not so, the procedure for expropriating 
land required for a public purpose will become self-defeating and stultified when 
it was meant to be expedient and efficacious. Again one has to take into 
consideration the amendment to,section 22 of Chapter 88, introduced by Act 
XI of 1989, to the effect that the expropriating authority is now obliged to 
deposit on account in the Court Registry such amount offered by it by way 
of compensation and without any prejudice to any balance eventually due to 
the person having an interest in the expropriated land by way of compensation 
after the title of such land will have been transferred to the competent authority 
by outright purchase. Practice shows that much ti�e elapses in any case where 
the amount of compensation is either agreed upon or determined. Necesitas 
publica major est quam privata. 
From what we have seen in this short article it appears that while in practice 
both the Maltese Courts and the European Court have been inundated with 
allegations of all sorts of violations of sections 37 and 38 of the Constitution 
as well as Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention, the 
fundamental right to property being the next most important human right after 
the right to life and liberty, in theory a delineation of the right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of one's possessions poses more questions than it answers. 
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